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Abstract:   In this paper I present a ’report card’ on the current state of Australia’s competition laws, 
focusing on antitrust laws. I consider the three core antitrust provisions in the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Act (2010) – the laws against cartels, abuse of market power 
and anticompetitive mergers. In each of these areas, particularly cartels, I find that 
Australia’s laws could be significantly improved. I also consider more innovative reforms 
to Australia’s competition regulations, to improve the transparency of pricing and to 
reduce customer switching costs. I note that these reforms have been broadly successful. 
I. IntroductIon: colIn clArk
colin clark’s name is at the very forefront of those who have shaped the subject of economics 
in the 20th century. colin clark’s career is testimony against such present tendencies as there are 
to divorce economics from current human concerns. Although he has worked within a rigourous 
framework of economic theory and a search for empirical regularities or laws governing economic 
phenomena, his attention has always been focused on large social issues. His name is immediately 
brought to mind by the mention of such major problems as the process of economic development, 
population growth and food supply, macro economic forecasting and policy, the limits of taxation 
and the optimal size of cities. His choice of research areas has never been inhibited by narrow 
consideration of the scope of economics; wherever his social conscience and penetrating intellect 
have led him he has followed. It has never crossed his mind to accept the conventional wisdom 
uncritically or to refrain from exposing its inadequacies.1
these words describe one of the greatest economists of the 20th century. they were spoken 
by a former dean of my faculty at Monash university, Gus Sinclair. Gus delivered those words 
when honouring Professor clark with an honorary doctor of Economics degree at Monash 
university in 1983. 
1  Sinclair, G. quoted in Monash reporter (1983).TwEnTy-firsT colin clArk lEcTurE: noVEmbEr 2011
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It is a great pleasure for me to be here today to deliver the colin clark lecture. I will not 
dwell on Professor clark’s stellar career, with oxford and cambridge universities, working 
with leading lights such as keynes and Pigou; with the Queensland government and with 
Australian universities including the university of Queensland and Monash university. I will 
not dwell on the accolades he received in his lifetime and his standing alongside numerous 
winners of the nobel Prize for economics science. rather I would like to begin this talk by 
passing on some brief reflections from Professor clark’s almost 10 years at Monash university.
talking to my colleagues about their personal memories of Professor clark makes three 
things clear. First, Professor clark was an exceptional colleague whose passion was applying 
economics to the real world. Second, Professor clark was a towering intellect – the person 
who always asked that polite but insightful question at seminars to which the speaker can 
only reply “ooooppps”. And third, Professor clark was a man of great principle who sought 
to make a real difference to Australia and to the world.
Professor clark’s graduation speech on receiving his honorary doctorate from Monash 
university is as relevant today as it was in 1983. He talked about appropriate government 
policy to deal with high unemployment and compared the efficacy of spending on public works 
relative to reductions in taxation.
What I want to cover today involves a different although I believe equally important area: 
the role of government in setting the regulations and rules of the marketplace. I can only hope 
that my talk today is as relevant in 20 years as Professor clark’s graduation talk of 20 years 
ago is relevant today.
II. BAckGround on coMPEtItIon rEGulAtIon
2.1 Is Competition Regulation a Contradiction in Terms?
It may be considered that competition and regulation are alternative ways to organise economic 
interactions. Superficially, regulation appears to limit competition by restricting the nature 
of economic interactions. under such a view, regulation is the antithesis of competition and 
‘competition regulation’ is a contradiction in terms.
this perspective, however, confuses market-based competition with anarchy. Economic 
competition can only arise where there is a well functioning set of rules that govern market 
place interaction. At a minimum, economic interactions rely on laws governing property rights 
and rules of contract. If there are no laws of property rights then there can be no trade. one 
party can simply seize what they desire from another party if they use sufficient force. If there 
are no rules of contract, then it is difficult, if not impossible, to manage payment for a trade. 
So some regulation or ‘rule of law’ is a necessary precondition for the existence of economic 
transactions in a market. In the absence of such regulation, there may be military competition 
but not economic competition.
Most markets, however, have significantly more than minimal regulation. And either directly 
or indirectly, all market-based regulation affects the nature of competition. this is most obvious 
for regulations that proscribe certain types of market conduct. rules that make it illegal to 
sell certain products clearly limit – and intend to eliminate – competition in those products. 
However, regulations can alter competition in more subtle ways, by limiting particular sTEPhEn P. king
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transactions, by altering the costs of exchange or by changing the barriers to entry or exit for 
particular market participants. 
By ‘competition regulation’, I am going to focus on a particular set of laws established by 
governments around the world that aim to improve the functioning of market-based transactions 
in goods and services, excluding labour services. In Australia, these rules are embodied in the 
Competition and Consumer Act (2010), formerly known as the Trade Practices Act. Indeed, 
I am going to focus on a particular subset of these rules and only consider those parts of the 
Act that fall under the broad rubric of ‘antitrust laws’. 
2.2 The Rise and Rise of Antitrust Laws
Antitrust laws generally refer to a range of laws which, at a minimum, include rules that:
•  Prevent competitors from explicitly agreeing not to compete (cartel laws); 
•  Prevent firms that have market power from using that power in a way that limits 
competition (abuse of market power or monopolization laws); and 
•  Prevent mergers or acquisitions between competitors that are likely to significantly 
reduce competition (merger laws).
these laws have their modern origins at the end of the nineteenth century in the united 
States. the name ‘antitrust’ refers to the use of a legal ‘trust’ structure by businesses so that 
a number of competitors could make decisions through a central structure and, in so doing, 
avoid competing with each other.
the Sherman Act was passed in the united States in 1890. It included basic rules relating 
to cartels and monopolization. the Clayton Act was introduced in 1914 to deal with mergers 
that might have the effect of reducing competition.2
In Europe, antitrust laws only developed in the 1950s. Indeed, in Germany, cartels were 
encouraged in the early 1900s as a way to protect business from cut-throat competition and price 
wars. transnational European competition laws have their origin in the 1951 treaty of Paris.
In Australia, the first attempts to introduce national antitrust laws occurred soon after 
federation. these laws were ineffective due to constitutional limits on the federal government. 
the inability of the federal government to introduce national antitrust laws continued until 
1974 when the Trade Practices Act was introduced. the federal government avoided the 
constitutional constraints by limiting the scope of the Act to corporations. Indeed it can be 
argued that a truly national and inclusive set of antitrust laws did not exist in Australia until 
1996 when, following agreement by all the states, mirror legislation was introduced across 
Australia to ensure that all businesses were captured by our competition laws.3
recently, competition laws (or new competition laws) have been enacted in a wide range 
of countries.4 If we just focus on the Asian region, India, for example, had a Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act since 1969. However, the law was largely ineffective and has 
2  See Motta, (2004), chapter 1 for a brief overview of antitrust laws in the united States and Europe.
3  this agreement followed the influential report into national competition Policy (commonwealth of Australia, 
(1993). See king (1997) for an overview of the report’s recommendations and their implementation.
4  For  details  on  competition  laws  around  the  world,  see  the  Global  competition  Forum  at  www.
globalcompetitionforum.orgTwEnTy-firsT colin clArk lEcTurE: noVEmbEr 2011
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recently been replaced by the Competition Act, with the new enforcement body, the competition 
commission of India, becoming operational in 2009. Indonesia has had competition laws in 
place since 2000, but it is revising these laws to overcome enforcement issues. Singapore’s 
Competition Act established the competition commission of Singapore in 2005. china’s first 
antitrust laws were enacted in August 2007 and came into effect in August 2008. Malaysia’s 
Competition Act is in the process of moving from enactment to enforcement. 
III. So HoW IS AuStrAlIA GoInG In ‘BrEAd And ButtEr’ 
coMPEtItIon lAWS?
Given the global popularity of antitrust laws, it is timely to see how Australia’s own competition 
laws are operating. I will start my report card on these laws by focusing on the three main 
provisions that characterise antitrust laws worldwide: laws prohibiting cartels and price-fixing, 
laws preventing the abuse of market power, and laws restricting anti-competitive mergers. 
3.1 Australia’s Cartel Laws
the Australian cartel laws are broadly in line with other western countries. like the uS and 
the Eu we have broad laws against price fixing and anti-competitive arrangements. 
Section 44ZZrF of the Competition and Consumer Act (2010) (hereafter ccA) states that:
“A corporation must not make, or give effect to, a contract, arrangement or understanding that 
contains a cartel provision.”
The Act defines a ‘cartel provision’ as:
“A provision relating to (a) price-fixing; or (b) restricting outputs in the production and supply 
chain; or (c) allocating customers, suppliers or territories; or (d) bid-rigging; by parties that are, or 
would otherwise be, in competition with each other.”
More broadly, under section 45.2.(a) of the ccA:
“A corporation shall not: (a) make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an understanding, if: … 
(ii) a provision of the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding has the purpose, or would 
have or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition … .”
like other western countries, Australia has criminal penalties for cartel conduct and the Accc 
uses a leniency policy to try and undermine cartel stability. this suggests that Australia’s 
cartel laws a fairly standard in an international context – perhaps worthy of a ‘B’ rating on 
our report card. 
Such a conclusion would be incorrect. unfortunately there is a serious problem with 
Australia’s cartel laws which lies with the court’s determination of the meaning of “contract, 
arrangement or understanding”. 
the courts in Australia have made it clear that an understanding is ‘less’ than a contract 
or arrangment. In Top Performance Motors Pty Ltd v Ira Berk (Queensland) Pty Ltd (1975) 
24 Flr 286 at 291, Smithers J. stated that an understanding:sTEPhEn P. king
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“[M]ust involve the meeting of two or more minds. Where the minds of the parties are at one that 
a proposed transaction between them proceeds on the basis of the maintenance of a particular state 
of affairs or the adoption of a particular course of conduct, it would seem that there would be an 
understanding within the meaning of the Act.“
this ‘meeting of minds’ could be evidenced by inference from behaviour, an approach taken by 
the Australian competition and consumer commission (Accc) in ACCC v Leahy Petroleum 
[2004] FcA (1678) (the Ballarat petrol case). At 299 of the judgment in that case, Merkel J. 
states that:
“In my view, calls between the respondents and price increases by them on a price-increase day 
can afford evidence of both the making of the understanding and giving effect to it. Also, because 
the understanding provided for a process for the fixing or controlling of prices, as opposed to the 
actual fixing or controlling of prices, it is not an essential element of the Accc’s case that all of 
the contesting respondents’ prices always increased within a stipulated period of time (eg three 
hours) or that they moved to exactly the same level. Further, even if there was a lag in the increase 
in price by triton’s retailers, that is not inconsistent with the Accc’s case that triton gave effect 
to the understanding by informing its retailers that it was withdrawing or reducing price support in 
order to cause the retailers to move to the increased price. Finally, it is clear that some or all of the 
initiating respondents coordinated the price increase on each of the days relied upon by the Accc 
and I have found that the contesting respondents were aware of the fact that the price-increase and 
follow-up calls were related to the increases occurring or in progress. thus, the respondents were 
aware that matching increases to the targeted or proposed price, or thereabouts, were increases 
that were likely to be part of the coordinated increase that was occurring or in progress on the 
price-increase days. of course, whether the contesting respondents were parties to the coordinated 
increases relied upon by the Accc on price increase days depends on all of the evidence.”
In paragraph 300, Merkel J. notes that: 
“the approach I have adopted, which treats the price-fixing understanding as a process for procuring 
coordinated increases and requires both a price increase by a party and a phone call between that 
party and a competitor on the alleged “giving effect to” day, addresses many of the issues raised 
by the contesting respondents.”
In contrast, an ‘understanding’ may require evidence of a degree of ‘commitment’. As Grey J. 
states in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd [2007] 
FcA 794 (the Geelong petrol case) at.34): 
“the notion of an arrangement or understanding that each party will act as it sees fit on every 
occasion is entirely foreign to s 45 of the trade Practices Act.“
thus, in Apco Service Stations Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
[2005] FcAFc 161 (2005) AtPr 42-078 (‘Apco Service Stations’) at [43] – [47], the court 
considers the situation of Apco, a petrol retailer that had received but not initiated phone 
conversations relating to price increases. the court (paragraph 44) noted that:
“[t]hese findings lead to the unavoidable conclusion that Apco was not a party to any understanding 
that it would fix its prices at the same level as the other respondents or at any particular level or 
even that it would increase its prices at all. “Fixing” is not used in s 45A in any technical sense. 
… certainly Apco received information about price increases (albeit the fact of an increase rather TwEnTy-firsT colin clArk lEcTurE: noVEmbEr 2011
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than the amount) from Bentley and carmichael, as it did from other sources such as its franchisees, 
but it reserved to itself the decision, as a matter of commercial judgment, whether to follow those 
prices up.”
this  Full  Federal  court  decision  endorsed  the  comments  by  Lindgren  J.  in  Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd [1999] FcA 954 (1999) 92 FCR 
375 at [141]. Lindgren J.. said:
“the cases require that at least one party “assume an obligation” or give an “assurance” or 
“undertaking” that it will act in a certain way. A mere expectation that as a matter of fact a party 
will act in a certain way is not enough, even if it has been engendered by that party. In the present 
case, for example, each individual who attended the Meeting may have expected that as a matter of 
fact the others would return to their respective offices by car, or, to express the matter differently, 
each may have been expected by the others to act in that way. Each may even have “aroused” 
that expectation by things he said at the Meeting. But these factual expectations do not found 
an “understanding” in the sense in which the word is used in ss 45 and 45A. the conjunction of 
the word “understanding” with the words “agreement” and “arrangement” and the nature of the 
provisions show that something more is required.”
At paragraph 41, Grey, J. states that:
“the line between what amounts to an ‘understanding’ for the purposes of s 45(2)(a) and what falls 
outside the spectrum of consensual dealings relevant to that provision will always be difficult to 
draw. this is particularly so in a case such as the present, in which there is an absence of evidence 
of express communications from which arrangements or understandings might have been derived, 
and a consequent reliance upon courses of conduct, coupled with circumstantial evidence, as the 
only means by which the existence of arrangements or understandings can be established. the 
crucial question in this case is on which side of the shadowy line delimiting ‘understanding’ the 
conduct of various parties fell.”
the requirement to show ‘commitment’ for an illegal understanding creates a significant hurdle 
for cartel prosecution. tacit collusion would rarely if ever be illegal under such an approach 
– which may be a good or bad thing from an economic perspective. More importantly, what 
might appear to be prima facie evidence of explicit price collusion, including meetings to 
discuss pricing, may be insufficient to show a price-fixing cartel unless there is evidence of 
commitment. 
In my opinion, the current interpretation has become too restrictive. It makes the decision 
in the Ballarat petrol case an anomaly. In that case, retailers exchanged phone calls in an 
attempt to organize price increases and were often (but not always) successful in doing so. 
However, there were no recordings of conversations that made a commitment clear. While 
the Ballarat case had admissions by some of the participants that they were engaged in a price 
fixing arrangement, the Geelong Petrol case makes it clear that such admissions may carry 
limited weight. 
As a result, potential colluders may be able to avoid our cartel laws by carefully orchestrating 
any interactions. they may discuss prices privately with each other, but so long as each party 
makes it clear that they will make their own decisions in their own best interest, then they 
may avoid the level of commitment needed for prosecution. sTEPhEn P. king
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In my opinion, this places the legal ball far too far into the potential colluders court.
the government has reacted to this limitation in our cartel laws in an odd way. A Bill is 
currently before parliament to make ‘price signalling’ illegal. However, these new provisions 
will initially apply only to the banking industry. At the same time, the amendments are quite 
general. So it is not clear why (other than for political reasons) the amendments are limited 
to one sector of the economy. From an economic perspective, it is not obvious that ‘price 
signalling’ is bad in banking but benign elsewhere, or that the balance between desirable and 
undesirable price signalling is different between banking and other parts of the economy. So a 
significant problem with the amendments is that they apply to only one part of our economy. 
they either should apply to all markets or not at all. 
It is made clear in both the Explanatory memorandum and the regulation Impact Statement 
associated with the Bill that the amendments are directed against activity that may facilitate 
collusion but that falls short of the current legal interpretation of an ‘understanding’. As the 
Explanatory memorandum notes: 
“‘disclosure’ is defined as a unilateral communication; no degree of reciprocity or mutuality is 
required for there to be a disclosure.”
So the laws correctly identify a key weakness in our current cartel laws. Fixing this weakness 
generally would be desirable, again highlighting the oddity of limiting the laws to the banking 
sector. 
the amendments fall into two parts: rules against private price disclosure and rules about 
general disclosures.
Private disclosure to competitors (either direct or via an intermediary) of price related 
information is per se illegal. It is illegal even if the information is otherwise available. So if 
businesses communicate price information to each other in a way that is not also available to 
the public, they have committed an offence. 
this is a strong prohibition. However, in my opinion, the restrictions on private price 
disclosures are worthwhile. 
tacit collusion is easier if businesses can exchange price information and respond to 
each other through direct communication. For example, suppose two businesses, A and B, 
are competing and business A wants to push prices up. to do this, A starts by raising his 
price. A wants B to follow. But A doesn’t know if B has observed the price rise. If B does 
not follow A’s price up immediately, is it because B is not ‘playing along’ or that B has not 
noticed the price rise? Should A cut his price, perhaps to below the initial level, to ‘punish’ 
B for not following the price rise or not? It is easier for A to interpret B’s actions if business 
A knows that business B has seen the price change – for example, because A has directly 
told B of the price change.
the rules against private price disclosure tackle this issue directly. A per se offence is 
strong, but the amendments allow for legitimate exceptions to be ‘notified’ or ‘authorised’.
overall, in many industries, banning private price disclosure is unlikely to raise problems. 
For example, in petrol retailing, I cannot see any legitimate reason why retailers should privately 
disclose their prices to each other in a way that is not also available to the public. the same 
would hold in grocery retailing – and indeed in most areas of retailing. Part of the reason is TwEnTy-firsT colin clArk lEcTurE: noVEmbEr 2011
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that the retailers generally don’t need to ‘work together’ and prices are not customer specific.
the laws against private price disclosures could easily be applied broadly to Australian 
business. But they only apply to banking. 
General disclosures are broader and are not a per se offence. under s.44ZZX.1 of the 
amendments:
A corporation must not make a disclosure of information if:
(a)  the information relates to one or more of the following (whether or not it also relates to other 
matters):
(i)  a price for, or a discount, allowance, rebate or credit in relation to, division 1A goods 
or services supplied or likely to be supplied, or acquired or likely to be acquired, by the 
corporation;
(ii)  the capacity, or likely capacity, of the corporation to supply or acquire division 1A goods 
or services;
(iii) any aspect of the commercial strategy of the corporation that relates to division 1A goods 
or services; and
(b)  the corporation makes the disclosure for the purpose of substantially lessening competition 
in a market.
the actions caught here are much broader. Indeed, pretty much anything could relate to 
‘commercial strategy’ and be caught by the provision. However, to successfully prosecute the 
Accc would need to show that the disclosure is for the purpose of substantially lessening 
competition. In the absence of a ‘smoking gun document’ or a degree of interaction between 
competitors that is so obvious that it is probably a ‘contract, arrangement or understanding’, 
it is unclear that it will ever be possible to prove purpose.
of course, the legal hurdle against public disclosure needs to be large. Public disclosures 
are the very nature of competition. there is no point discounting if I can’t tell my customers. 
there is no point putting on a new range of products if I can’t announce this strategy to my 
customers.
But this is the problem with the general disclosure rules. they want to stop ‘bad’ disclosures 
while not hurting ‘good’ disclosures. But it is often impossible to tell the difference. For example, 
business A announces a price rise. Is this an illegal disclosure aimed at getting business B to 
raise her prices or is it simply informing customers? Business B follows by announcing that 
she will raise her prices as well. Is this simply unilateral profit maximizing behaviour (if my 
rival’s price goes up then of course it pays me to also raise my price) or ‘something more’ 
such as tacit collusion?
A ‘substantial lessening of competition’ requirement is needed to avoid the laws becoming 
anti-competitive. But it also sets a hurdle for prosecution that will rarely be jumped.
So, in my opinion, the general disclosure laws are poorly developed and have not isolated 
anti-competitive behaviour. At best they will be ineffective. At worst, they could prevent 
legitimate competition and be harmful. And, by the way, they only apply to banking.
In summary, there is a clear problem with the scope Australia’s cartel rules. this problem 
has arisen due to court interpretation of the word “understanding”. this problem has been 
recognised by Parliament. However Parliament is only addressing it with regards to the banking 
sector. Such a narrow solution appears to be motivated more by politics then by a desire good sTEPhEn P. king
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competition rules.
Report Card Rating: D. Young Aussie must try harder in ‘cartels’ and avoid being misled 
by political opportunism.
3.2. Abuse of Market Power
under s 46(1) of the ccA:
“ A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market shall not take advantage of that 
power in that or any other market for the purpose of:
(a)  eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporation or of a body corporate 
that is related to the corporation in that or any other market;
(b)  preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market; or
(c)  deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other 
market.”
this part of the Act has a chequered history with significant wins but also confusions. However, 
this is to be expected and can be a sign of strength not weakness. Any law against abuse of 
market power must tread a fine line between moderating anticompetitive conduct and allowing 
pro-competitive conduct. For example, a reduction in price for, say, milk, by a retail grocery 
outlet creates significant benefits to milk customers. It can also benefit upstream milk suppliers 
to the degree that demand for their product increases. But if the price reduction is to a level 
that is below cost and has the purpose of driving other grocers out of the market in order to 
reduce competition and allow for higher future prices, then the price decrease may be viewed 
as predatory and undesirable. 
this need – to distinguish between pro-competitive and anti-competitive actions, both 
of which can ‘harm’ a competitor  – is captured by the requirement that a corporation ‘takes 
advantage’ of its market power. this connection between market power and the conduct has 
led to significant debate in the courts. See for example Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert 
Hicks Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 13. the courts are clear that, in order to violate the Act, a firm 
must ‘use’ its market power. However, they have been less clear about what such use entails. 
From an economic perspective, the requirement by the courts to look carefully at each 
case on its merits and to try and disentangle whether or not the conduct in question is a use 
of market power or is consistent with competition is a good thing. the economic boundaries 
between pro- and anti-competitive actions can be grey, and a law that tried to set simple 
boundaries around behaviour would risk deterring pro-competitive behaviour. 
there is, however, a political problem with such a nuanced approach to abuse of market 
power. competitors, who may be either suffering from such abuse or simply suffering from the 
rigors of strong competition, have a strong incentive to claim abuse and lobby for amendment 
to the Act. 
For example, in 2007 the Act was amended to introduce a predatory pricing provision 
that was explicitly aimed at protecting small business. In his comments in support of the 
amendment, Senator Joyce stated that: TwEnTy-firsT colin clArk lEcTurE: noVEmbEr 2011
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“I will be so presumptuous as to term the government amendment ‘the Birdsville amendment’ because 
that is the town in which it was devised. It was devised in a motel room whilst I was travelling out 
to the west of Queensland. taking that on board was a great step forward, not just for small business 
in Australia but for the way in which small businesses throughout the world assess market share.5 “ 
the Birdsville amendment means that section 46.1.AA of the ccA states that:
“A corporation that has a substantial share of a market must not supply, or offer to supply, goods 
or services for a sustained period at a price that is less than the relevant cost to the corporation of 
supplying such goods or services, for the purpose of:
(a)  eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporation or of a body corporate 
that is related to the corporation in that or any other market; or
(b)  preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market; or
(c)  deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other 
market.”
no actions have been brought under this part of the Act, in part because it is unclear what a 
‘substantial share’, a ‘sustained period’ or the ‘relevant cost’ mean. By trying to eliminate the 
ambiguity surrounding ‘take advantage’ the amendment simply introduces new ambiguity. 
the Birdsville amendment is the most obvious case of a politically-inspired attempt to 
subvert Australia’s laws against abuse of market power. However, there are regular calls for 
the Accc to ‘do something’ under section 46 to protect small business from the rigors of 
competition. 
Report Card Rating B. Young Aussie has shown balance and foresight in the area of 
‘abuse of market power’, but must be wary of the political bullies in the playground.
3.3 Mergers
Again, this part of the legislation is in line with international laws. the issue in Australia, 
however, relates to the process for merger clearance. We have an ‘informal’ clearance process 
that is established by the Accc and, before it, by the trade Practices commission. It has 
evolved over time since 1974. It is reasonably flexible and provides an informal court-based 
appeal process in the sense that the Accc states that it will seek an injunction to oppose a 
merger if merging parties seek to proceed after an adverse ‘informal’ outcome. 
Since 2006, there is also a formal merger clearance process established in the legislation. 
this process has legislated timelines and processes for appeal. the formal process has never 
been used. 
the operation of an informal clearance process, designed by the regulator in discussion 
with business and the legal profession, but with a ‘fall back’ of a formal clearance process, is 
a unique situation. It is also far from clear that it is stable.
the informal process has evolved over time as a result of business and political pressure. 
these pressures reached a climax with the decision in AGL v ACCC.6 this case followed a 
5  Hansard September 11, 2007, p.91
6  Australian Gas light company v Australian competition and consumer commission, [2003] FcA, 1525, 19 
december.sTEPhEn P. king
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breakdown in the existing informal process. the energy company, AGl, sought to acquire a share 
of an electricity generator in Victoria. the Accc was uncertain about the competitive effects 
of this acquisition and declined to either clear the acquisition or intervene in the acquisition. 
this “failure to decide” created significant business risk for AGl, who took the Accc to the 
Federal court seeking a ruling by the court that the acquisition was not anti-competitive. the 
judgement by French J made it clear that it was inappropriate for the Accc to hold “a sword 
of damocles” over a private company in relation to a merger decision. 
As a result of the AGl decision, the Accc substantially overhauled the informal merger 
clearance  process.  It  introduced  procedural  guidelines  for  merger  clearance  including 
commitments to timelines and to provide feedback to merger parties when competition issues 
arose. the Accc also committed to releasing Public competition Assessments outlining the 
reasoning behind its decision in controversial mergers.
these changes meant that, by the time the formal merger process had become law, many 
of the underlying reasons why business supported that formal process had disappeared. 
this does not, however, mean that the formal process is irrelevant. the formal merger 
clearance process provides an option for the business community if the Accc does not 
appropriately deal with mergers through the informal process. More importantly, the formal 
merger clearance process creates the risk for the Australian business community that the more 
flexible informal process that is currently used will disappear over time.
In new Zealand, a formal merger clearance process is part of the Commerce Act. this 
formal process has ‘crowded out’ less formal interaction between the regulator and the merging 
parties. this is unsurprising. A formal process provides certainty to the regulators over time. 
It creates a bureaucratic process so that the public servants who are in the regulatory authority 
can work step-by-step toward a merger decision. From the regulators perspective, it is safe. 
the fact that the formal merger clearance process has not crowded out the informal 
process in Australia appears to reflect the regulators’ commitment to the informal process 
and the reluctance of merging parties to use the more public formal process. However, such 
a situation is likely to be unstable. the incentives for the regulatory staff in the Accc will 
be to require formal clearance once this practice has started to be used. So my prediction is 
that, in ten years time, either the formal process will remain unused or the informal process 
will have disappeared.
Report Card Rating B+. Young Aussie has done a good job balancing different incentives 
for mergers. However, this situation is unlikely to last.
IV. InnoVAtIonS In coMPEtItIon rEGulAtIon
In the above, I discussed the standard rules that form the basis of competition regulation around 
the world. In this section, I look at innovations that have been introduced into the Australian 
law to improve its operation. these newer rules reflect a confidence that regulators can 
selectively intervene in markets in ways that can improve the functioning of those markets. 
they recognize that competition, simply left to operate within the broad parameters of antitrust 
laws, may not lead to the best outcome for either consumers or the economy. thus, these laws 
aim at changing the way the business operates to improve market outcomes.TwEnTy-firsT colin clArk lEcTurE: noVEmbEr 2011
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4.1 Transparency Reforms
the first set of reforms look at the way that information is conveyed to consumers in markets. 
the regulations aim to improve the accuracy of the information and to improve consumer 
decision-making.
4.1.1 Substantiation notices
While Australia’s antitrust laws have had legal restrictions against ‘misleading and deceptive’ 
conduct since 1974, to enforce the ccA requires that the regulator prove that the conduct was 
misleading or deceptive. Substantiation notices, introduced in 2010, are designed to assist the 
Accc in determining the legality of claims made by market participants. 
Section 219 in Part 2 of Volume 3 of the Act allows the Accc to issue a ‘substantiation 
notice’: 
“(2)  the regulator may give the person who made the claim or representation a written notice that 
requires the person to do one or more of the following:
(a)  give information and/or produce documents to the regulator that could be capable of 
substantiating or supporting the claim or representation; … within 21 days after the notice 
is given to the person.”
the Australian competition and consumer commission (2011, p.2) notes that:
“Substantiation notices do not require a person to prove that a claim or representation is true or 
is not misleading; rather, they are a preliminary investigative tool that helps the Accc determine 
whether further investigation is warranted.”
the Accc provides a range of examples of the types of claims that may require substantiation 
such as advertising about price reductions, claims about place of origin, health claims for 
foods, environmental claims or safety claims. 7
the power of substantiation notices is that they require businesses to back up claims that 
they make in the marketplace. Failure to substantiate a claim does not necessarily mean that 
the business has breached the Act. the courts recognise that businesses may make claims 
that are not meant to be interpreted on a literal basis and that most consumers can work out 
the difference between a serious claim and “puffery”. However, the ability of the Accc to 
issue a substantiation notice does place the onus on a business to be careful in statements that 
it provides to consumers and not to make claims that it cannot back up.
4.1.2 clear Pricing
recent court decisions and amendments to the Act have significantly clarified what is and 
is not allowable pricing.8 the clear pricing laws in s48 (Part 2, volume 3), introduced in 
2010, state that:
7  As a substantiation notice is an investigative tool, the ACCC does not publicize when it issues 
such a notice. However, it is my understanding that the ACCC has used substantiation notices in a 
number of investigations.
8  See for example, ACCC v Prouds Jewellers (2008), FCA 75.sTEPhEn P. king
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“(1)  A corporation must not, in trade or commerce … make a representation with respect to an 
amount that, if paid, would constitute a part of the consideration for the supply of the goods 
or services unless the corporation also: …
(c)  specifies, in a prominent way and as a single figure, the single price for the goods or 
services; …
(5)  For the purposes of subsection (1), the corporation is taken not to have specified a single price 
for the goods or services in a prominent way unless the single price is at least as prominent 
as the most prominent of the parts of the consideration for the supply.”
these rules changed common pricing practices that had the ability to mislead consumers. For 
example, new cars were often advertised with a price that excluded various charges (both 
taxes and ‘dealer’ charges). the new law now requires that any charges have to be included 
in a clear price that is prominent to the customer. As a result, car marketing has moved to 
advertising the ‘drive away’ price.
Similarly,  some  restaurants  would  surcharge  on  weekends  and  public  holidays. the 
surcharge was given as a percentage, often at the end of a menu. While the new law does not 
prevent surcharging it requires that the menu present surcharge-inclusive prices for all items. 
Effectively, this means that restaurants that wish to surcharge have to have two menus – one 
for ‘standard’ days and one for ‘surcharge’ days.
It might be argued that these rules create additional costs for sellers, and that these extra 
costs, even where small, may outweigh the benefits. this may be true and, to the best of my 
knowledge, there has been no formal study of the costs and benefits of these changes. However, 
there has been an analysis of a similar transparency reform in AtM charges. this reform, 
which involved relatively small system costs, appears to have led to significant changes in 
customer behaviour.
4.1.3 AtM reforms
In March 2009, automatic teller machine (AtM) fees were reformed to make them more 
transparent to customers. Prior to the reforms, customers who used a ‘foreign’ AtM for a 
transaction only found out about the fee associated with that transaction when they received 
their monthly bank statement. the reforms require that customers receive information about 
transaction charges when they actually make the transaction. Further customers have the option 
of cancelling the transaction when they see the charge.9 
these reforms were introduced as a simple way to increase transparency and competition. 
According to the reserve Bank of Australia these reforms, to a large degree, have worked. As 
Flood, Hancock and Smith (2011, p.43) note:
“All of the available information continues to suggest that consumers are responding to the pricing 
signals inherent in direct charging, and AtM owners are responding by increasing the availability 
of AtMs.”
this response is highlighted by Graph 1 from their paper.
9  For details on the reforms see Filipovski and Flood (2010).TwEnTy-firsT colin clArk lEcTurE: noVEmbEr 2011
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the reforms assist competition in two ways. First, when customers see the fee for a specific 
transaction they may decide not to continue with the transaction and seek a cheaper alternative. 
In other words, there might be ‘direct price competition’ between AtMs. 
there is some evidence of this. As Flood, Hancock and Smith (2011, p.45) note:
“Around 10 per cent of respondents indicated that they had planned to make an AtM cash withdrawal 
in the past month but cancelled the transaction because the AtM owner charged a fee.”
However, the rBA recognized that the scope for such direct price competition was likely to 
be weak. 
Filipovski and Flood (2010, p.43) note that:
“… where [consumers] use a foreign AtM, there is little evidence that they seek out the AtM with 
the lowest charge. In other words, where an AtM charging $2.00 and another charging $1.50 are in 
close proximity, cardholders do not necessarily choose the AtM charging $1.50. It is possible that 
this reflects the fact that cardholders typically need to proceed some way through the transaction 
process at the AtM before the direct charge is displayed. this may make it difficult to compare 
prices, particularly where cardholders are unfamiliar with the AtMs in a particular location.”
Second, the fees would change customer behavior over time, both with respect to where they 
carry out financial transactions and the institutions they choose to bank with. the reforms 
appear to have had significant success in increasing general transaction competition. 
“there has … been an increase in the number of agreements between card issuers and AtM owners 
to provide free transactions to cardholders.10”
10  Filipovski and Flood (2010) at p.48.
Graph 1: number of cash Withdrawals
contribution to year-ended growth, seasonally adjustedsTEPhEn P. king
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and 
“[F]inancial institutions compete for depositors partly by providing direct-charge-free transactions 
on a wide network of AtMs.11”
this competition has increased the range of AtMs available to card holders. Following the 
reforms:
“A number of new independent deployers have … entered the market. these players are helping 
to generate vigorous competition for AtM locations, with one consequence reportedly being rises 
in rents for AtM sites.12”
Interestingly, the reforms have not had a significant effect on the average level of AtM fees. 
roughly speaking, the charges to a cardholder for using a foreign AtM after the reforms 
are about the same as before the reforms. rather, the reforms have simply made the fees 
transparent. 
In other words, if consumers were acting fully on the monthly information available to 
them, the changes should have made little difference. But consumers appeared not to be aware 
of the fees they were being charged whether due to a standard economic cost (who has time 
to read their monthly bank statement in detail) or due to a ‘behavioural anomaly’ (the fee 
‘matters more’ when making the actual transaction than when presented in total on a statement). 
As Graph 5 from Flood, Hancock and Smith (2011) shows, the reforms now mean that the 
consumers who pay the fee are making an informed choice in general:
Graph 5: Main reason for Paying a direct charge
Per cent of respondents
11  Filipovski and Flood (2010) at p.48.
12  Flood, Hancock and Smith (2011) at p.44..TwEnTy-firsT colin clArk lEcTurE: noVEmbEr 2011
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In summary, the transparency reforms that have recently been introduced to Australia’s 
competition rules appear to have achieved significant gains at a relatively low cost. these 
types of reforms represent the best of simple economic analysis. there is no reason to suspect 
that imperfectly competitive markets will always reach an equilibrium that is desirable from 
the perspective of the information available to customers. careful and selective interventions 
to improve transparency can improve market efficiency and create big gains.
Report Card Rating A. Aussie is leading the world in simple transparency reforms. More 
of the same please.
4.2. Reducing Switching Costs
Switching costs can reduce the ability for a customer to move between alternative suppliers. 
A number of recent reforms aim to reduce switching costs for customers in order to promote 
competition.
In telecommunications, mobile number portability was introduced in Australia in 2001. 
the aim of mobile number portability is to make it easier for mobile phone customers to move 
between alternative phone companies.
Mobile number portability is now standard around the world. It is technically simple with 
the main approach involving the switched ‘number’ being recorded on a central database that 
is checked for call routing. 
the cost of portability is minimal and the time required to ‘port’ a mobile phone number 
can be as little as a few minutes (although in some jurisdictions days are required). 
In Australia, the carrier who is gaining the customer instigates the porting of the mobile 
number. the alternative, where the ‘losing’ carrier must instigate porting, can create incentives 
for delay and the imposition of non-monetary customer costs. 
Australia was an early adopter of mobile number portability, although Singapore introduced 
(limited) portability in 1997.13 
As far as I am aware, no-one has formally analysed the effectiveness of mobile number 
portability in changing the degree of competition. the closest study is analysis by Buehler, 
dewenter and Haucap (2005) on the amount of mobile numbers ported in Europe. the percentage 
of mobile subscribers who, on average, port their number in a year ranged from 20.8% in 
Finland to well under half-of-one-percent per year in France and Portugal (years 2003-04). It 
is difficult to draw any significant inference from such numbers, except to note that portability 
appears to have been a low cost way of helping competition in some jurisdictions. In some 
countries, there has been significant churn of mobile providers and portability appears to have 
been a key element in that churn.
More recently, the concept of portability for bank accounts has been raised as a way to 
increase competition in the Australian and overseas banking systems.
the report by the Independent commission on Banking in the uk (the Vickers report):
“[r]ecommends the early introduction of a redirection service for personal and SME current 
accounts which, among other things, transfers accounts within seven working days, provides 
13  See Buehler, dewenter and Haucap (2005).sTEPhEn P. king
33
seamless redirection for more than a year, and is free of risk and cost to customers. this should 
boost confidence in the ease of switching and enhance the competitive pressure exerted on banks 
through customer choice.14”
the report does not recommend full account portability because:
“[I]ts costs and incremental benefits are uncertain relative to redirection.15“
the report intimates that redirection will provide an appropriate competitive stimulus.
this conclusion is echoed in a recent Australian study. In 2010, the Australian federal 
government initiated an investigation into:
“[t]he potential timeline and processes for implementing full account number portability.16”
the subsequent report was presented to the government in July 2011.17 At paragraph 2.4 the 
report notes that:
“Implementation of full account portability, however, would be far from simple, and not at all 
analogous to telephone number portability as sometimes suggested. It would involve the replacement 
of the bank, state, branch (BSB) system of numbering, and wholesale revamping of the existing 
payments infrastructure and the systems of all the financial institutions which interface with it. It 
would be a major and costly undertaking.”
the banking system involves a wide range of bilateral arrangements. Full account portability 
would require that these arrangements are reorganised to enable the interrogation of a central 
account number database. thus, number portability for bank accounts would require a significant 
reorganisation of both the physical and It systems associated with transactions as diffuse as 
cheque clearing, AtM transactions, and rBA settlements. In summary, the report concludes 
at paragraph 2.19 that full account number portability:
“[W]ould involve major costs, which would ultimately be borne by payments system users, for 
relatively minor benefits.”
the Fraser report recommends a form of moderated switching for customers where the 
customer’s new bank, at the request of the customer, contacts the old bank and organises 
for relevant transaction details to be changed on the customer’s behalf. the customer would 
only need to sign a single form and the process would be moderated through the Australian 
Payments clearing Association (APcA).
“the APcA proposal envisages the development of a switching ‘mailbox’, a convenient and 
secure electronic means through which a customer’s new institution could request details of 
direct debits and credits and the customer’s existing institution could similarly provide that 
material quickly and efficiently. In other words, the mailbox would allow financial institutions 
to both make and respond to requests for relevant details of direct debit and credit arrangements 
of customers switching their transaction accounts. APcA estimates that its work on the project 
would take about six months to complete and cost it about $250,000; some additional spending — 
14  Independent commission on Banking (2011) at p.17.
15  Independent commission on Banking (2011) at p.17.
16  commonwealth of Australia, (2010) at p.3.
17  Fraser (2011).TwEnTy-firsT colin clArk lEcTurE: noVEmbEr 2011
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unquantifiable at this time but likely to be modest — would be required by participating financial 
institutions on changes to their back‐office and processing arrangements.18” 
the federal government is aiming to introduce the recommended switching process on 1 July 
2012.19 
Report Card Rating A. Aussie has careful analysis of costs and benefits driving on going 
policy. Be nice if someone did a retrospective on mobile number portability – but can’t 
ask for everything.
V. concluSIon
Australia has done well on this competition regulation report card. In particular, in areas of 
regulatory innovation, Australia is leading the world. our regulatory approach to increasing 
the transparency of key customer information appears to be improving the way the competition 
works in a range of markets. Similarly, reforms to reduce customers’ switching costs have 
been beneficial and, in the case of mobile number portability, have been copied around the 
world.
this innovation is no surprise. Australia, over the past two decades, has shown a willingness 
to tackle key competition problems using innovative solutions. national competition Policy was 
the core of this innovation in the 1990s. two decades later, it is being analysed by a number of 
countries overseas so that they can learn from the Australian experience. For example, India is 
looking at Australia’s competition reforms from the 1990s as a way to improve transparency 
in government transactions and reduce corruption. Europe is looking to Australia’s experience 
from the 1990s to see if there are lessons for reforming the economies in countries under 
financial and economic stress.
At the same time, Australia’s innovative competition reforms are not finished. As an 
example, consider credit card reform. Approximately five years ago, Australia reformed the 
rules for credit card transactions, allowing merchants to surcharge. the aim of this reform 
was to improve customer choice over payment instruments. these reforms, however, appear 
only to have been partially successful. the Payments System Board is currently considering 
further reform. one possibility is to use Australia’s experience with AtM reform in order to 
make clear the costs that consumers incur when choosing different modes of payment.
Australia’s performance in traditional areas of antitrust, unfortunately, is weaker. Australia’s 
cartel laws are narrow by international standards due to judicial interpretation of those laws. 
the current ‘price signaling’ amendments before the federal parliament appear motivated 
more by political expediency than by good economics. Further the Act has had a number of 
relatively recent amendments relating to both mergers and the abuse of market power, which 
have been dormant. these laws, some of which are poorly drafted, create risks and uncertainties 
for business in the future.
So, overall, Australia should be proud of its successes in competition regulation. However, 
as is the bottom line in almost all report cards, Australia can ‘do better’.
18  Fraser (2011) at paragraph 3.14.
19  Swan,(2011).sTEPhEn P. king
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